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Abstract:  Problem  statement:  The  Dogs  of  the  Dow  (Dow  Dogs)  strategy,  which  has  gained 
widespread popularity in the U.S., is found to be considerably successful in China’s stock markets. 
This trading  strategy contradicts the  well-established efficient  market  hypothesis. Approach: This 
study examines the cross-sectional variations in the magnitude of the predictive power of the Dow 
Dogs strategy using Chinese stocks for 1994-2009. Results: Our results suggest that (1) Significant 
Dow Dogs effect apply to Class A shares, but not Class B shares; (2) Stocks priced between $1 and $5 
demonstrate the strongest Dogs effect among all stock price ranges; (3) Changes in share price range 
has the most powerful impact on risk adjusted return, followed by changes in the AB share class, 
rebalancing frequency and number of Dogs in the portfolio. Conclusion: Our results suggest that the 
superior predictive power of the Dow Dogs strategy is mainly driven by behavioral factors. Our overall 
findings  support  the  behavioral  hypothesis  in  which  market  inefficiency  stems  from  investors 
irrationality and herding behaviors. This  study provides  practical implications to both  government 
regulators and finance practitioners. JEL Classification: G14, G15. 
 
Key words: Dogs of the Dow, China stock market, market efficiency, Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA),  capital  markets,  foreign  investors,  herding  behaviors,  market  economy, 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  The Dogs of the Dow strategy was first brought to 
public attention in 1988 by a Wall Street Journal article 
(Dorfman, 1988) which documents that during the period 
1972-1987, the performance of the ten highest yielding 
Dow  Jones  Industrial  Average  (DJIA)  stocks  beat  the 
DJIA by an average annual return of 7.6 %. Ever since, 
this trading technique has gained tremendous popularity 
in  the  investment  community.  This  trading  strategy 
seems to contradict the well-established efficient market 
hypothesis and it has triggered a large body of academic 
research  in  both  the  U.S.  and  internationally  to 
investigate  the  causes  of  this  anomaly.  Various 
explanations have been proposed and some studies have 
found inconsistent performance of this trading strategy. 
To  date,  no  consensus  has  been  reached  on  the  true 
nature  of  the  Dow  Dogs.  Motivated  by  this  on-going 
debate, we examine the cross-sectional variations in the 
predictive effects of the Dow Dogs strategy in China and 
shed light on this controversial subject.  
  Over the past two decades, China has experienced 
dynamic economic growth and emerged as the second 
largest  national  economy.  Its  capital  markets  are 
expanding rapidly to accommodate its transition from a 
centralized control system to a market economy and both 
domestic  and  foreign  investors  pursuing  global 
diversification opportunities have been attracted to these 
markets.  China’s  institutional  structure  and  the  early 
stage of its capital market development result in a trading 
environment  with  a  few  features  that  may  promote 
speculative activities, but it also provides a unique setting 
for us to investigate the sources of the market anomaly 
associated with the Dow Dogs strategy.  
  Our  results  suggest  that  the  superior  predictive 
power of the Dow Dogs strategy is mainly driven by 
behavioral  factors.  Specifically,  we  find  that  the 
significant Dow Dogs effect prevails in class A shares 
but  not  in  class  B  shares.  In  addition,  the  abnormal 
returns are more pronounced for stocks priced between 
$1  and  $5,  than  for  stocks  in  other  price  ranges. 
Previous  literature  has  established  the  connection 
between  share  turnover  ratio  and  irrational  market 
sentiment.  We  find  that  class  A  shares  and  stocks Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 560-568, 2011 
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between $1 and $5 have significantly higher turnover 
ratio than stocks in other categories, suggesting that the 
capital  flow  caused  by  human  psychological  factors 
play an important role in the market anomaly induced 
by the Dow Dogs strategy. Our overall findings support 
the behavioral hypothesis in which market inefficiency 
stems  from  investors  irrationality  and  herding 
behaviors. This study provides practical implications to 
both government regulators and finance practitioners. 
 
China’s stock markets: Currently, mainland China has 
two  stock  exchanges.  They  are  the  Shanghai  Stock 
Exchange  (SHSE),  established  in  1990  and  the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), established in 1991. 
Both markets have expanded rapidly and are ranked the 
third  and  fifth  largest  stock  exchanges  in  the  world 
based on total value of shares traded by the end of 2009 
World Federation of Exchanges.  
  Chinese  stock  markets  have  several  distinguishing 
characteristics  that  stem  from  its  special  institutional 
structures  that  may  foster  a  higher  level  of  exuberant 
investor behavior. First, Chinese markets are segmented 
between domestic and foreign investors through class A 
and B shares. Most listed companies issue A shares. A 
small proportion of listed companies issue both A and B 
shares or issue B shares only. Class A shares are quoted 
in Chinese Yuan and are restricted to domestic investors 
and  selected  foreign  institutional  investors.  Class  B 
shares  are  quoted  in  foreign  currencies  and  were 
available only to foreign investors before March 2001. 
Since March 2001, Chinese investors can also trade B 
shares  with  legal  foreign  currency  accounts.  However, 
Chinese  investors  have  limited  access  to  foreign 
currency. The A share market is known to be dominated 
by individual investors who normally have less expertise 
and resources than institutional investors and, therefore, 
may be more subject to speculative forces. 
  Second, China’s legal system is still developing. 
The  quality  of  Chinese  security  laws  in  terms  of 
disclosure  standards  and  enforcement  are  relatively 
weak. The level of information transparency between 
public investors and firm  managers is lower than in 
common law countries such as the U.S. (La Porta et 
al., 1998). Information asymmetry is known to create 
incentives for opportunistic behavior among investors. 
Currently, companies that issue both A and B shares 
are  required  to  prepare  two  version  of  financial 
statements.  One  is  based  on  China’s  domestic 
Generally  Accepted  Accounting  Principles  (GAAP) 
for  the  A  share  holders,  the  other  is  based  on 
International  Accounting  Standards  (IAS)  for  the  B 
share holders. The level of disclosure is stricter for the 
B class shares (Bao and Chow, 1999).  
  In addition, still in their burgeoning stage, China’s 
security markets offer limited investment and hedging 
alternatives and a limited number of stocks to meet the 
investment  needs  of  a  growing  investor  base  in  a 
booming economy. For example, short sales are banned 
in  China  and  option  markets  are  non-existent.  These 
limits  present  considerable  barriers  to  arbitrage 
mispricing  in  the  equity  market  and  create  greater 
potential of market bubbles and anomalies over time.  
  Finally,  China’s  State-Owned  Enterprises  (SOEs) 
are still in the middle of the privatization process, a large 
portion of the issued shares of the listed companies are 
state  shares,  legal  person  shares  and  employee  shares, 
none of which are available for public investors (Sun and 
Tong, 2003). Non-tradable shares as a fraction of total 
shares  has  been  declining  since  2005  after  China  put 
forth  a  series  of  programs  to  accelerate  privatization. 
However,  in  2008  the  present  central  government 
embarked  on  a  reversing  process  of  market  economy 
reform and tightened the control of state ownership of the 
major  enterprises  in  China.  The  average  non-tradable 
ratio  during  our  sample  period  is  53.8%.  That  the 
number  of  available  shares  does  not  match  the 
increasing  investment  needs  of  Chinese  households 
further  exacerbates  the  market  exuberance  problem. 
These  special  attributes  of  current  Chinese  markets, 
however,  afford  us  the  opportunity  to  compare  the 
predictive  power  of  the  Dow  Dogs  strategy  across 
behavioral  variables  that  would  be  difficult  to 
accomplish in more developed markets.  
 
Literature  review:  The  article  that  introduced  the 
Dogs of the Dow strategy appeared in the Wall Street 
Journal  in  1988  (Dorfman,  1988).  It  documented  the 
abnormal returns earned over the market by applying 
the  Dow  Dogs  strategy  for  the  period  1972-1987. 
O'Higgins and Downes (1991) and Knowles and Petty 
(1992)  confirmed  the  effectiveness  of  the  Dow  Dogs 
strategy  and  highly  promoted  this  simple  trading 
concept to the public. Ever since, this trading technique 
has received a wealth of attention from both financial 
practitioners and academia.  
  The Dogs of the Dow is one of several investment 
strategies that challenge the efficient market hypothesis 
(Fama, 1970) (Researchers have provided evidence of 
other market anomalies, including the P/E ratio (Basu, 
1977; Campbell and Shiller, 1988b; Fama and French, 
1988), dividend yield (Fama and French, 1988), book-
to-market ratio (Kothari and Shanken, 1997), aggregate 
insider  trading  (Nejat,  1988),  dividend-price  ratio 
(Campbell and Shiller, 1988a), and equity share (Baker 
and  Wurgler  (2000),  to  name  a  few).  These  market 
anomalies  have  inspired two  popular explanations that 
provide  different  perspectives  on  the  subject.  One  is 
based on implications of the traditional efficient market 
hypothesis. The other is based on the recently emerged Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 560-568, 2011 
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behavioral hypothesis that allows for irrational behavior 
on the part of investors.  
  Proponents  of  the  efficient  market  hypothesis 
assume that investors are rational and any over-reaction 
or under-reaction of investors tends to offset or cancel 
out any mispricing. Hence, prices normally reflect true 
asset  value  (Fama,  1998).  According  to  Black  (1993), 
some of the anomalous evidence is purely a result of data 
mining or statistical artifacts. Davis et al. (2000) reason 
that due to the limits of currently developed theories and 
models, some unobserved risks of the assets cannot be 
fully captured by the Capital Asset Pricing Model and, 
therefore, the market anomalies are a result of investors’ 
biased perception of true asset value. Fama and French 
(1993;  1995;  1996)  propose  multi-factor  models  that 
appear to explain the average returns on a full scale.  
  The behavioral camp, on the other hand, relaxes 
the assumption of investor rationality. Albert Einstein 
once said “Only two things are infinite, the Universe 
and  Human  Stupidity  and  I’m  not  sure  about  the 
former.”  The  behaviorists  believe  that  investors  are 
subject  to  various  cognitive  errors  and  can  make 
illogical  and  irrational  investment  decisions. 
According  to  Barber  and  Odean  (1999),  people’s 
deviations  from  rationality  are  often  systematic. 
Systematic  over-reaction  to  information  is  common 
among investors. When the over-reaction is eventually 
corrected,  over-adjusted  stock  returns  converge  or 
reverse.  Hogarth  and  Reder  (1986);  Einhorn  and 
Hogarth  (1986);  Kleidon  (1986);  De  Bondt  et  al. 
(1987)  and  Lakonishok  et  al.  (1994)  are  among  the 
group that support the behavioral hypothesis. 
  The effectiveness and logic of the Dow Dogs has 
also  been  debated  among  academics  for  many  years. 
The  initial  rationale  offered  for  the  superior 
performance of Dow Dog portfolios was that the high 
dividend  yield  best  represents  the  company’s  future 
perspective relative to its stock price and over time the 
price  will  revert  to  a  normal  level.  O'Higgins  and 
Downes  (1991)  claim  that  the  Dow  Dogs  strategy  is 
based on simple logic and may produce returns in any 
rational market. However, a natural question is raised as 
to why public investors cannot recognize the economic 
value  of  the  predictive  effect  of  this  strategy  and 
eventually arbitrage away the opportunity.  
  To  date,  the  puzzle  of  the  Dogs  of  the  Dow 
anomaly  remains  unsolved.  Domian  et  al.  (1998) 
compare the Dow Dogs effect during, before and after 
the 1987 market crash and argue that the Dogs effect is 
a  loser-winner  effect  during  the  pre-crash  period. 
Hirschey  (2000)  carefully  replicates  the  Dow  Dogs 
strategy  and  argues  that  the  previously  documented 
exceptional return of the Dogs is caused by data errors 
and data mining and, therefore, that the Dow Dogs effect 
still  conforms  to  the  traditional  asset  pricing  model. 
However, Prather and Webb (2001) reexamine the Dow 
Dogs approach and refute Hirschey (2000) data mining 
explanation. The Chinese stock markets examined in the 
present research effort offer an interesting new venue in 
which to continue the analysis of the Dow Dogs. 
 
Data:  We  obtain  monthly  dividend  yield  data  from 
Morningstar Direct and daily market returns, with cash 
dividends reinvested, from the Chinese Securities Market 
and  Accounting  Research  databases  (CSMAR). 
Observations with daily average trading volume less than 
50,000  shares  are  eliminated  to  ensure  liquidity.  We 
compute the monthly returns from the daily returns and 
convert  all  shares  into  US  dollars  based  on  historical 
currency exchange rates. In addition, observations prior 
to  1994  are  excluded  because  of  infrequent  trading 
during this time period. After merging the two datasets, 
our sample contains 1,611 stocks covering 105,429 firm-
month observations. Out of the 1,611 stocks, 1,509 are in 
class A and 102 are in class B.  
  In formulating portfolios, an approach similar to that 
employed by Ainina et al. (2010) is followed to examine 
the price level impact on the performance of the trading 
strategy.  In  separate  iterations,  our  portfolios  are 
restricted to shares with prices: (1) lower than $1; (2) 
greater than or equal to $1 and lower than $5; (3) greater 
than or equal to $5 and lower than $10; (4) greater than 
or equal to $10; (5) greater or equal to $1; and (6) greater 
than or equal to $5.  
  Table  1  A  and  B  report  the  average  level  of 
monthly dividend yields and average turnover ratio, 
respectively, across different stock price ranges for 
each  year  in  the  study.  The  Turnover  Ratio  is 
computed by dividing the average total market value 
of traded shares by the average total market value of 
tradable shares of our sample for each month. 
Previous  studies  have  established  a  positive 
relationship between share turnover and the investor 
speculation  (Merton,  1987;  Cochrane,  2002;  Mei  et 
al., 2009). Merton (1987) argues that the size of the 
investor base is associated with  market value of the 
stocks.  Similarly,  Cochrane  (2002)  finds  that  high 
share turnover ratio explained high prices during the 
technical bubble in the late 1990s. Mei et al. (2009) 
provide empirical evidence on how China’s a share 
premium is driven by heavy turnover ratio. Table 1 
shows  that  both  variables  fluctuate  with  market 
movements. Stocks priced between $1 and $ 5 have 
the highest average turnover ratio and stocks below 
$1  have  the  lowest  average  turnover  ratio.  This 
pattern suggests that for a fixed amount of tradable 
shares, price between $1 and $5 is the most popular 
stock  price  range  while  stocks  priced  below  $1 
receive  the  least attention among investors.  Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 560-568, 2011 
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Table 1:  Descriptive statistics across price ranges over sample years 
(A)  Average  monthly  dividend  yield  across  price  ranges 
over sample years 
  Price   $1≤Price  $5≤Price  Price≥ 
Year  <$1(%)  <$5(%)  <$10(%)  $10(%) 
1994  3.11  2.06  2.52  2.11 
1995  4.04  2.91  2.64  1.97 
1996  3.85  2.22  2.52  1.70 
1997  2.76  1.54  1.46  1.06 
1998  4.90  1.71  1.48  1.13 
1999  4.86  1.68  1.51  1.40 
2000  4.05  1.29  1.13  1.00 
2001  2.15  1.17  0.87  0.99 
2002  1.77  1.24  1.02  0.99 
2003  1.67  1.43  1.16  1.21 
2004  2.11  1.71  1.31  1.64 
2005  3.00  2.51  1.74  2.45 
2006  2.88  2.32  1.42  1.59 
2007  1.63  1.16  0.79  0.68 
2008  2.75  1.78  1.24  1.06 
2009  2.57  1.51  1.13  1.19 
Average   3.01  1.76  1.50  1.38 
 
Table 1B: Average  turnover  ratio  across  price  ranges  over  sample 
years         
  Price  $1≤Price  $5≤Price  Price≥ 
Year   <$1(%)  <$5(%)  <$10(%)  $10(%) 
1994  37.40  50.40  32.50  42.80 
1995  18.20  20.10  21.40  16.50 
1996  34.00  57.80  31.30  29.90 
1997  24.90  33.90  28.10  29.40 
1998  16.10  20.70  16.70  21.10 
1999  19.00  18.80  16.20  20.40 
2000  11.20  24.20  20.20  20.70 
2001  14.70  11.10  9.20  11.60 
2002  8.20  9.30  8.10  8.70 
2003  9.00  10.00  7.90  9.00 
2004  10.30  15.30  12.40  11.50 
2005  14.00  16.50  10.80  14.10 
2006  24.20  31.90  26.20  24.10 
2007  37.70  51.30  43.30  33.20 
2008  17.40  27.50  25.40  19.60 
2009  20.40  46.20  42.20  31.00 
Average   19.80  27.80  22.00  21.50 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive statistics between class A and Class B shares 
over  sample  years  (A)  average  monthly  dividend  yields 
between  class  A  shares  and  Class  B  shares  over  sample 
Years   
Year  A(%)  B(%) 
1994  2.34  3.69 
1995  3.08  5.95 
1996  2.48  5.51 
1997  1.42  3.59 
1998  1.52  7.19 
1999  1.62  6.73 
2000  1.23  4.61 
2001  1.09  2.01 
2002  1.19  2.16 
2003  1.38  2.29 
2004  1.74  2.43 
2005  2.61  4.05 
2006  2.28  3.35 
2007  0.94  1.52 
2008  1.52  3.26 
2009  1.24  4.27 
Average  1.73  3.91 
Table 2B:Average share turnover ratio between class A shares and 
class B shares over sample years 
Year  A(%)  B(%) 
1994  44.50  33.20 
1995  18.60  20.10 
1996  49.10  22.90 
1997  33.10  21.80 
1998  20.30  15.20 
1999  18.40  21.90 
2000  23.70  6.00 
2001  10.20  19.90 
2002  9.60  4.20 
2003  10.10  4.20 
2004  14.40  3.80 
2005  16.00  3.10 
2006  30.40  7.50 
2007  48.50  15.40 
2008  26.60  3.80 
2009  43.90  8.30 
Average  26.10  13.20 
 
This  evidence  is  also  consistent  with  Brown  and 
Mitchell  (2008)  finding  on  price  clustering  for  A 
shares  caused  by  a  Chinese  cultural  effect.  In 
Chinese  culture,  the  number  “8”  is  considered  a 
lucky number and number “4” is considered unlucky. 
Investors  may  chase  stocks  with  prices  around  8 
RMB Yuan, which is in the range of $1 and $5 after 
the  currency  conversion  and  avoid  stocks  priced 
around 4 RMB Yuan, which is below $1. 
  Table  2  A  and  B  compare  the  average  dividend 
yield and average turnover ratio, respectively, between 
class A and class B shares over time. It shows B shares 
have significantly higher dividend yields than A shares. 
This  large  gap  can  be  explained  by  the  well 
documented  price  premium  of  A  shares  over  their  B 
counterparts (Bailey, 1994). It also is consistent  with 
the  dividend  signaling  theory  that  the  information 
asymmetry  between  China’s  domestic  market  and 
foreign investors may force the company to pay high 
and consistent dividends to attract potential demand for 
B share stocks. The average turnover ratio of A shares 
exceeds that of B shares for most of our study period. 
 
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
 
  We  construct  total  1,512  portfolios  based  on  the 
Dogs of the Dow method. We first split the sample into 
six different price ranges and AB classes. Next we form 
the equally weighted portfolios by varying the holding 
periods  before  rebalancing  and  the  number  of 
companies included in the portfolios. Specifically, we 
select the top N stocks with the highest dividend yields 
during  the  previous  three  months  starting  from  April 
1994, where, in separate iterations, N = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45 and 50 and form 
equally  weighted  portfolios.  Then,  each  portfolio  is 
held  for  a  certain  number  of  months  (M),  where,  in 
separate  iterations,  M  =  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6  and  12 Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 560-568, 2011 
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months. The portfolio is then reformulated every M 
months  using the above described selection criteria 
through the end of 2009 for each price category and 
each  share  class.  This  procedure  results  in  the 
formulation  of  1,512  portfolios  (6  different  price 
ranges  multiplied  by  2  share  classes,  18  different 
portfolio sizes and 7 different holding periods). For 
each portfolio, we compute: (1) the Terminal Value 
(TV)  of  $1  as  an  initial  investment,  (2)  the 
Information Ratio and (3) the Batting Ratio.  
  To  compute  Information  Ratio,  the  daily  total 
value  weighted  aggregate  market  returns  with  cash 
dividends  reinvested  is  used  as  the  market 
benchmark. We convert the daily data into monthly 
returns from 1994 through 2009. In order to make a 
consistent  comparison,  in  calculating  both  the 
Information  and  Batting  Ratios,  the  holding  period 
before  rebalancing  the  market  benchmark  is  set 
identical to the pertinent Dogs portfolio. 
  To  compute  the  Information  Ratio,  we  use  the 
mean difference between portfolio returns of the subject 
portfolio and the benchmark returns as the numerator. 
The  denominator  is  the  portfolio's  holding  period 
tracking error,  which is the  standard deviation of the 
portfolio's  holding  period  excess  returns  over  the 
benchmark  returns.  Specifically,  the  formula  for 
Information Ratio is as follows: 
 
T
t 1 t bm,t
T 2
t t 1
Excess Return
Information Ratio
Tracking Error
(R R ) / T
1
(e e)
T 1
=
=
=
-
=
-
-
∑
∑
 
Where: 
 
Rt  =  Return of portfolio for time period t  
Rbm,t  =  Return of benchmark for time period t  
T  =  Number of time periods 
t e   =  Excess returns at time t 
e   =  Mean excess return  
 
  We  calculate  the  batting  ratio  by  dividing  the 
number  of  months  in  which  the  performance  of  the 
subject portfolio beat or matched the market return by 
the  total  number  of  months  in  the  study  period.  The 
formula is presented as follows. 
  Let I be the indicator function such that: 
 
I(True) = 1 
I(False) = 0 
 
T
t 1 t bm,t Batting Ratio I(R R ) / T 100 = = ³ ´ ∑  
 
Where: 
 
Rt  = Return of the subject portfolio for time period t  
Rbm,t  = Return of the bench mark for time period t  
T  = Number of time periods in the study  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Analysis of the cross-sectional performance: In the 
rest of this section, we analyze and compare the average 
Terminal Value of $1 invested, the Information Ratio 
and  the  Batting  Ratio  across  the  various  portfolio 
classifications.  Table  3  compares  the  ratios  among 
different  stock  price  ranges.  Table  3A  shows  that 
portfolios priced between $1 and $5 perform the best, 
with an average Terminal Value of $10.95 compared to 
$5.85  for  the  market  benchmark.  However,  stocks 
below  $1  and  between  $5  and  $10  fail  to  beat  the 
market  index.  They  underperform  the  market 
benchmark return, have Batting Ratios lower than 50% 
and Information Ratios below zero.  
  The  above  pattern  is  consistent  with  the  share 
turnover ratio ranking over different price ranges. The 
share turnover is the highest for stocks priced between 
$1 and $5 and greater than $10 and lowest for stocks 
priced below $1. From this, we conclude that investors’ 
preference  for  shares  trading  within  their  favorite 
trading  range  constitutes  an  important  reason  for  the 
performance of the Dow Dogs portfolios. This evidence 
confirms the hypothesis raised by Merton (1987) that 
investors’  recognition  drives  up  the  size  of  investor 
base and may in turn boost asset values.  
   
Table 3:  Average terminal value of $1 invested, information ratio 
and  batting  ratio  over  different  numbers  of  included  stocks 
across  price  ranges  (A)  average  terminal  values  of  $1  over 
different numbers of stocks across price ranges   
  Price   $1≤  $5≤  Price  Market 
Top_N  <$1  Price<$5  Price<$10  ≥$10  Index 
1  2.969  12.622  1.521  12.55  5.85 
2  3.087  12.303  2.259  9.633  5.85 
3  4.188  12.464  3.079  8.535  5.85 
4  4.374  12.684  2.114  8.823  5.85 
5  3.795  12.314  2.381  8.183  5.85 
6  3.495  11.718  2.530  8.529  5.85 
7  3.932  10.323  2.500  8.323  5.85 
8  5.688  9.804  2.502  7.139  5.85 
9  5.592  8.822  2.533  6.516  5.85 
10  5.340  10.071  2.446  6.559  5.85 
15  5.067  10.169  2.380  6.243  5.85 
20  4.478  9.674  2.324  6.061  5.85 
25  4.609  10.606  2.302  6.282  5.85 
30  4.529  10.546  2.278  6.258  5.85 
35  4.356  10.769  2.289  6.262  5.85 
40  4.229  10.817  2.250  6.078  5.85 
45  4.083  10.734  2.314  6.079  5.85 
50  4.087  10.634  2.258  5.961  5.85 
Average  4.328  10.949  2.348  7.445  5.85 Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 560-568, 2011 
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Table 3B: Average information ratio over different numbers of stocks 
across price ranges 
1  0.033  0.035  -0.21  0.21 
2  -0.026  0.070  -0.193  0.184 
3  -0.019  0.063  -0.180  0.176 
4  -0.003  0.064  -0.246  0.183 
5  -0.010  0.077  -0.259  0.176 
6  -0.025  0.069  -0.257  0.178 
7  -0.011  0.072  -0.233  0.162 
8  0.037  0.071  -0.256  0.140 
9  0.058  0.065  -0.251  0.129 
10  0.049  0.085  -0.253  0.130 
15  0.010  0.086  -0.262  0.125 
20  0.000  0.087  -0.285  0.120 
25  0.003  0.107  -0.297  0.125 
30  -0.019  0.116  -0.296  0.123 
35  -0.031  0.127  -0.282  0.123 
40  -0.042  0.127  -0.283  0.117 
45  -0.053  0.128  -0.278  0.118 
50  -0.053  0.125  -0.280  0.114 
Average  -0.006  0.087  -0.256  0.146 
 
Table (3C): Average batting ratio over different numbers of stocks 
across price ranges 
  Price   $1<Price  $5<Price  Price > 
Top_N  <$1(%)  <$5%  <$10%  $10% 
1  48  51  44  52 
2  51  53  43  50 
3  50  51  43  54 
4  47  54  42  55 
5  48  55  41  56 
6  47  56  41  57 
7  49  55  43  55 
8  51  55  42  53 
9  52  55  43  53 
10  50  54  43  54 
15  51  55  42  53 
20  50  57  41  53 
25  50  59  41  53 
30  49  59  43  53 
35  48  59  43  53 
40  48  60  43  53 
45  47  60  43  53 
50  48  60  43  53 
Average  49  56  42  54 
 
Table 4:  Average  terminal  value  of  $1  invested,  information  ratio 
and batting ratio over different holding periods (in Months) 
across price ranges 
  Price   $1≤  $5≤  Price≥   Market 
Holding_M  <$1  Price<$5  Price<$10  $10   Index 
1  8.79  14.81  4.59  9.23  5.85 
2  4.86  14.08  2.16  9.21  5.85 
3  3.54  10.43  3.41  7.62  5.85 
4  2.8  16.41  1.9  7.5  5.85 
5  2.37  8.73  1.56  6.91  5.85 
6  2.53  8.06  1.39  4.93  5.85 
12  5.41  4.12  1.41  6.71  5.85 
Average  4.33  10.95  2.35  7.45  5.85 
 
Table (4B): Average information ratio over different holding periods 
(in Months) across price ranges 
1  0.06  0.07  -0.06  0.09 
2  0.10  0.1  -0.14  0.11 
3  0.02  0.09  -0.17  0.14 
4  0.00  0.15  -0.33  0.15 
5  -0.03  0.18  -0.26  0.20 
6  -0.05  0.10  -0.36  0.09 
12  -0.14  -0.09  -0.47  0.25 
Average  -0.01  0.09  -0.26  0.15 
Table (4C): Average batting ratio over different holding periods (in 
Months) across price ranges       
1  50.30%  53.50%  47.70%  51.70% 
2  50.10%  54.70%  41.90%  56.80% 
3  52.10%  54.40%  46.10%  54.80% 
4  48.00%  59.80%  36.10%  48.10% 
5  51.90%  53.90%  46.20%  51.20% 
6  49.10%  58.30%  33.70%  52.40% 
12  43.00%  57.30%  45.80%  59.80% 
Average  49.20%  56.00%  42.50%  53.50% 
     
Table 5A: Average terminal value of $1 invested, information ratio, 
and batting ratio across share classes 
  Terminal Value   Information  Batting 
  of $1 Invested  Ratio    Ratio 
  -----------------  ---------------  ----------------------- 
Top_N  A  B  A  B  A(%)  B(%) 
1  11.8253  5.9  0.1  -0.004  47.70  49.10 
2  16.6330  6.1  0.1  -0.015  51.00  50.70 
3  17.4414  4.9  0.1  -0.036  52.70  49.60 
4  16.1904  4.7  0.1  -0.033  54.00  49.00 
5  15.8760  4.5  0.1  -0.031  55.00  49.70 
6  14.6408  4.4  0.1  -0.024  54.90  50.60 
7  12.8921  4.4  0.1  -0.023  55.00  50.80 
8  12.4539  4.9  0.1  -0.016  54.00  50.80 
9  11.7910  4.8  0.1  -0.014  54.20  50.80 
10  12.6565  4.8  0.1  -0.011  53.70  50.90 
15  12.2839  4.9  0.1  -0.011  54.50  50.70 
20  11.7654  4.8  0.1  -0.014  55.60  50.40 
25  11.4943  4.7  0.1  -0.014  56.20  50.50 
30  10.9529  4.7  0.1  -0.015  55.70  50.50 
35  10.9582  4.6  0.1  -0.016  55.80  50.40 
40  11.0594  4.6  0.1  -0.016  56.50  50.40 
45  10.9730  4.6  0.1  -0.016  55.90  50.40 
50  10.7031  4.6  0.1  -0.016  55.90  50.40 
Average  12.9217  4.8  0.1  -0.018  54.40  50.30 
 
Table 5B: Average terminal value of $1 invested, information ratio, 
and batting ratio over different holding periods (in Months) 
across share classes 
  Terminal    Information 
  Value of $1 Invested  Ratio    Batting Ratio 
Holding  --------------------  ---------------  ------------------ 
_M  A  B  A  B  A(%)  B(%) 
1  16.66388  6.1519  0.1125  0.0006  53.70  48.90 
2  15.96112  4.9421  0.1522  -0.016  54.80  49.30 
3  13.75381  5.2658  0.1185  0.0074  54.80  51.60 
4  17.46453  5.0896  0.1372  -0.0368  53.70  48.80 
5  10.00029  4.3504  0.1109  0.0553  55.90  49.40 
6  9.36925  4.1353  0.0676  -0.0182  52.70  51.40 
12  7.23911  3.8863  0.0168  -0.1188  54.80  52.90 
Average  12.92171  4.8316  0.1023  -0.0181  54.40  50.30 
 
Table 3B and 3C demonstrate that only stocks trading 
between $1 and $5 grow in value as greater numbers of 
stocks are included in the subject portfolio. 
  The  other  price  ranges  show  the  opposite  trend, 
suggesting  that  the  diversification  effect  by  holding 
more stocks applies selectively. Stocks priced greater 
than  $10  have  higher  information  ratios  than  stocks 
between  $1  and  $5,  indicative  of  the  relatively  low 
price volatility for higher priced shares. Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 560-568, 2011 
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  Table 4 reports the comparative performance over 
different holding periods across different price ranges. 
In  Table 4A  stocks  of  all  price  ranges  show  a  slight 
downward  overall  trend  as  we  extend  the  holding 
period before rebalancing up to twelve months. Stocks 
priced between $1 and $5 realize the highest average 
Terminal  Value,  $10.95,  equivalent  to  an  annualized 
return of 17.3%, followed by stocks priced greater than 
$10. Again, stocks below $1 and between $5 and $10 
fail  to  beat  the  market  index.  In  Table  4B  and  4C, 
stocks priced between $1 and $5 and stocks greater than 
$10  lead  other  price  ranges  in  the  Batting  Ratio  and 
Information Ratio. Table 5A reports the performance 
results based upon the number of stocks included in 
the subject portfolio  and across share type. A shares 
outperformed B shares substantially based on all three 
measurements for all portfolios. Table (5B) compares 
the performance over different holding periods by share 
type. Significant abnormal returns are observed for shares, 
but not for B shares. The average Terminal Value for A 
shares is $12.92, comparative to an annualized return of 
18.6  %,  exceeding  the  market  index  returns  of  12.5%, 
while B shares have an average Terminal Value of $4.83, 
an  equivalent  annualized  return  of  11.06%.  A  shares’ 
average  Batting  Ratio  and  Information  Ratio  are 
54.35%  and  0.10,  while  B  share  have  an  average 
Batting  ratio  of  50.3%  and  -0.018.  Note  that  as  the 
number of stocks included in the portfolios increases, 
both  the  Terminal  Value  and  the  Information  Ratio 
decrease for A shares, indicating that including  more 
stocks does not help improve either the raw returns nor 
the risk-adjusted returns.  
  As  a  further  robustness  check,  we  apply  the 
following stepwise regression model:  
 
i 1 1,i 2 2,i 3 1,i 4 2,i
5 3,i 6 4,i 7 5,i 8 6,i i,t
R X X D D
D D D D
= a +b +b +b +b
+b +b +b +b + e
  (1) 
 
Where: 
 
Ri  = The Terminal Value of portfolio I;  
X1,i  = The number of companies included in portfolio I, 
X2,i  = The number of holding period (in months) before 
rebalancing for portfolio I, 
D1,i = Dummy  variable  that  equals  “1’  if  shares  in 
portfolio i are class A shares, or “0” if class B 
shares, 
D2,i  = A dummy variable that takes a value of “1” if 
portfolio i contains stocks priced greater than $1, 
“0” otherwise, 
D3,i = A dummy variable that takes a value of “1” if 
portfolio i contains stocks priced between $1 and 
$5, “0” otherwise D4,i is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of “1” if portfolio i contains stocks 
priced between $5 and $10, “0” otherwise. 
D5,i  =A  dummy  variable  that  takes  a  value  of  “1”  if 
portfolio  i  contains  stocks  priced  greater  than 
$10, “0” otherwise  
D6,i  = A dummy variable that takes a value of “1” if 
portfolio i contains stocks priced greater than $5, 
“0” otherwise.  
 
  In Eq. 1, class B shares and stocks priced below $1 
are  the  hold-out  categories.  We  also  test  Eq.  1  after 
replacing the Terminal Value with the Information Ratio. 
Table 6A of Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates of 
the  regression  when  the  dependent  variable  is  the 
Terminal  Value.  The  adjusted  R
2  is  46.43%  and  all 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
The intercept is 3.83, representing the average Terminal 
Value for portfolios in class B shares and priced below 
$1. The coefficients of b1 for the  number of  included 
companies  and  b2  for  the  holding  month(s)  before 
rebalancing are -0.054 and -0.55 respectively. They are 
both statistically significant and negatively related to the 
Terminal Value, but not economically significantly.  
  The coefficient of b3 is 8.09. It suggests that on 
average Terminal Value for class A shares beat class 
B shares by $8.09, or by 14.9% annual return. Stocks 
priced  greater  than  $1  earned  an  extra  $13.49  of 
Terminal Value, or 18.9% annual return above stocks 
priced  below  $1.  Stocks  priced  between  $1  and  $5 
earned an extra $6.62 or 13.4% annual return on average. 
The primary source of the superior performance of stocks 
priced greater than $1 comes from stocks priced between 
$1 and $5. From Table 1 and 2 summary statistics, both 
A  shares  and  stocks  priced  between  $1  and  $5  have 
significantly  greater  average  turnover  ratio  than  other 
categories, suggestive of a connection between abnormal 
return  and  turnover  ratio.  Table  6B  presents  the 
regression results of Eq. 1 with the Information Ratio as 
the dependent variable. The adjusted R
2 is 57.11% for 
this estimate. 
  Except  for  the  intercept,  all  coefficient  estimates 
are significant at 1% level. Stocks priced greater than 
$1  lead  the  Information  Ratio  by  0.189  over  stocks 
priced  below  $1.  The  major  contributor  of  the  high 
information ratio is stocks priced greater than $10. The 
Information Ratio for class A shares is 0.12 greater than 
class B shares on average.  Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 560-568, 2011 
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Table 6:  Cross-sectional regressions of portfolio performance Table 
(6A) A: Ri = Terminal Value       
Independent Variable   Estimate      P-value 
Intercept  3.836***    <0.01 
Top_N  -0.054***    <0.01 
Holding_N  -0.552***    <0.01 
A_Class  8.090***    <0.01 
Price≥$1  13.497***    <0.01 
$1≤Price<$5  6.621***    <0.01 
$5≤Price<$10  -1.98***    <0.01 
Price≥$10  3.118***    <0.01 
Price≥$5  6.038***    <0.01 
N
           1,512   
Adj R
2  0.460     
 
Table (6B): Ri = Information Ratio       
Independent Variable   Estimate    P-value 
Intercept  -0.0150    -0.162 
Holding_N  -0.0110***      <0.01 
A_Class  0.1200***    <0.01 
Price≥$1  0.1890***    <0.01 
$1≤Price<$5  0.0930***    <0.01 
$5≤Price<$10  -0.2500***    <0.01 
Price≥$10  0.1502***    <0.01 
Price≥$5  0.1030***    <0.01 
N
           1,512   
Adj R
2  0.5711     
***denotes the statistical significance at the 1% level 
    
  After the screening by the stepwise model, all the 
predictive variables are retained except the number of 
companies in the portfolios, suggesting that how many 
dogs are included in the portfolio is not important in 
predicting  the  risk  adjusted  returns.  One  potential 
explanation behind this phenomenon is that the Dogs 
of the Dow strategy identifies clusters of homogenous 
stocks  with  insignificant  idiosyncratic  volatility, 
especially stocks other than those between $1 and $5. 
The  results  raise  two  interesting  points.  First,  the 
portfolio  performance  is  more  sensitive  to  the 
behavioral variables, such as stock price ranges and 
AB class. Switching among different price ranges and 
AB  class  dramatically  impact  both  the  compound 
return  and  risk  adjusted  return  of  the  portfolio. 
Second, holding more stocks in the portfolio does not 
appear to improve either gross returns or risk-adjusted 
returns. This is in direct contradiction to theory on risk 
and diversification. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  The  distinct  investment  features  and  institutional 
setting  of  China’s  stock  markets  provide  us  a  unique 
opportunity to examine the Dow Dogs strategy. In this 
study, we investigate the cross-sectional variation in the 
strength  of  the  Dow  Dogs  effect  over  different  price 
ranges  in  A  and  B  shares  in  mainland  China’s  stock 
markets.  We  find  that  the  average  turnover  ratio  for 
stocks priced between $1 and $5 and stocks in class A is 
significantly  greater  than  that  of  other  subsamples, 
suggesting  that  these  two  categories  of  stocks  attract 
most  investors’  attention  and  are  associated  with 
relatively naïve investors. Further analysis indicates that 
superior Dow Dogs performance is more pronounced for 
A shares than for B shares and for stocks priced between 
$1  and  $5  than  for  stocks  in  other  price  ranges.  This 
result  is  consistent  with  the  explanation  that  irrational 
behavior on the investors proxied by share turnover ratio 
drives the market anomaly associated with the Dogs of 
the  Dow  strategy.  Our  study  provides  new  empirical 
evidence  which  is  consistent  with  behavioral  finance 
literature and it sheds light on the long-debated Dogs of 
the Dow phenomena. 
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